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In Afrox Healthcare Beperk v. Strydom,1 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that the common law recognises hospitals’ ability to exclude 
liability for medical malpractice resulting in death or physical or 
psychological injury, provided that the exclusion does not cover 
gross negligence. The Court rejected the notion that upholding 
exclusion clauses that exempt hospitals from liability for negligence 
causing death or bodily or psychological injury are a breach of the 
right of access to healthcare stipulated in the Constitution,2 or are 
contrary to public policy.1 
Recently, however, it has been suggested that the common 
law should be modified in light of the constitution, to prohibit 
exclusions from negligence causing death or bodily or 
psychological harm.3 Events have now been overtaken by the 
Consumer Protection Act,4 which states that unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust contract terms5 are prohibited,6 and that certain terms 
and conditions have to be drawn to consumers’ attention.7 The 
Act also states that the common law should be developed ‘as 
necessary to improve the realisation and enjoyment of consumer 
rights generally’.8
This paper deals with the common law position regarding 
hospital exclusion clauses that limit liability for medical 
malpractice resulting in death or bodily or psychological harm, 
and the constitutional position regarding such exclusion clauses. 
It will also consider when, under the Consumer Protection Act, 
such clauses may be regarded as unfair, unreasonable or unjust 
contract terms, and when certain terms and conditions have to be 
drawn to consumers’ attention.
Common law position regarding hospital 
exclusion clauses that limit liability for 
medical malpractice resulting in death or 
bodily or psychological injury
In the Afrox case,1 the admission form signed by the patient included 
the following exclusion clause:
I absolve the hospital and/or its employees and/or agents from all 
responsibility and indemnify them from any claim instituted by any 
person (including a dependant of the patient) for damages or loss 
of whatever nature (including consequential damages or special 
damages of any nature) flowing directly or indirectly from any injury 
(including fatal injury) suffered by or damage caused to the patient 
or any illness (including terminal illness) contracted by the patient, 
whatever the causes are, except only with the exclusion of intentional 
omission by the hospital, its employees or agents.1
In the Afrox case, the patient had been admitted for an operation 
and post-operative medical treatment. After the operation, a nurse 
had negligently caused him injury by applying a bandage too tightly 
and cutting off the blood supply to a sensitive part of his body. The 
patient sued the hospital and the latter denied liability based on the 
above exclusion clause.1
The patient argued that he should not be bound by the exclusion 
clause, on the grounds that the clause was against the public 
interest because: 
a)  There was unequal bargaining power between the patient and the 
hospital. 
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b)  The clause exempted hospital personnel from carrying out their 
duties professionally. 
c) The clause excluded hospital personnel from gross negligence 
d)  The hospital was a provider of medical services and the clause 
conflicted with his constitutional right of access to healthcare. 
In the alternative, the patient argued that the clause was also in 
conflict with the principles of good faith, and that the admission 
clerk should have drawn his attention to the exclusion clause, and 
had not done so.9
The court in the Afrox case1 rejected the patient’s arguments 
concerning the public interest on the following grounds. First, in 
respect of the claim of unequal bargaining power, there was no 
evidence that the patient was in a weaker bargaining position than 
the hospital. As regards the claim that the provision protected hospital 
staff who did not carry out their duties professionally, the court held 
that there are sufficient sanctions by health service professional 
bodies and statute law to ensure compliance with professional rules, 
and that in any event it would be not be in the interests of a private 
hospital’s ‘reputation and competitiveness’ to allow negligence by its 
staff. The court agreed with the patient’s submission that exclusion 
from gross negligence was contrary to the public interest, but found 
that gross negligence had not been alleged by the patient in this 
case. Lastly, the court held that the clause did not conflict with the 
constitutional right of access to healthcare because the Constitution2 
also recognises that contractual freedom and contractual conditions, 
such as indemnity against negligence by nursing staff, are part of the 
freedom to contract.9
In respect of the alternative arguments, the Afrox case rejected the 
‘good faith’ argument on the basis that good faith may be one of the 
foundations of the law of contract, but is not a rule of law of itself, nor 
is it an independent basis for negating the exclusion clause. It also held 
that there was no duty on the clerk to explain the clause to the patient 
(which the patient had signed without reading), and the patient could 
not say that he did not expect such a clause in the contract because 
today such clauses are the rule rather than the exception.9
The Afrox case1 has been severely criticised by a number of writers on 
the basis that the decision of the court was out of touch with reality 
for several reasons: 
a)  The professional bodies do not in practice sufficiently protect the 
public from errant members, and information about their decisions 
is not easily accessible. 
b)  Patients do not regularly ‘shop’ at hospitals to find the best terms 
and conditions. 
c)  Patients are unlikely to expect clauses excluding professional 
liability in hospital admission forms when they are subjected to 
advertising campaigns stating how good the professional staff at 
the relevant hospitals are. 
d)  Giving patients access to hospitals that put their life or health at risk 
and then denying patients redress undermines the constitutional 
right of access to healthcare.10
A provision in the exclusion clause in the Afrox case, that was 
unenforceable but was not relevant to the decision, was the attempt 
to indemnify the hospital if the patient had died, ‘from any claim 
instituted by any person (including a dependant of the patient)’. Under 
the common law, such clauses are of no force and effect unless the 
person excluded also agrees to the terms in the exclusion clause.11 
Constitutional implications of hospital 
exclusion clauses limiting liability for 
medical malpractice resulting in death or 
bodily or psychological injury
Although in the Afrox case the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that exclusion clauses limiting liability for medical malpractice 
resulting in death or bodily or psychological injury do not limit 
access to healthcare, it can be argued that they may undermine the 
constitutional rights to life12 and bodily and psychological integrity.13 
The judge who gave the judgment in the Afrox case has himself 
suggested that if the case had been argued on the basis that ‘any 
contractual exemption from liability for death and/or personal injury 
is per se contrary to public policy, the result may very well have been 
different’.14 This statement was quoted in passing by a provincial 
high court judge who suggested that such clauses infringe on the 
constitutional rights to life and bodily and psychological security, 
and are therefore contrary to public policy.15 
The Constitutional Court has held that, in deciding the 
constitutionality of contract terms, the court must ascertain 
whether the terms are contrary to public policy, as informed by the 
Constitutional rights and values found in the Bill of Rights.16 The 
rights to life and bodily and psychological integrity are embodied 
in the Bill of Rights, and it has been said that compelling a patient 
to waive these rights in order to obtain medical treatment or to be 
admitted to a hospital ‘would surely be contrary to public policy’.17 
The matter has now been dealt with by the Consumer Protection 
Act4 which came into effect on 31 March 2011.
The effect of the Consumer Protection 
Act on hospital exclusion clauses limiting 
liability for medical malpractice resulting in 
death or bodily or psychological injury
The Consumer Protection Act4 provides that unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust contract terms5 may result in the court setting aside the 
exclusion clauses that a provider of services, such as a hospital, 
seeks to rely upon.18 In addition, certain terms and conditions have 
to be drawn to the attention of consumers,19 otherwise they too 
may be set aside.20
Unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms
The Consumer Protection Act4 prohibits suppliers from imposing 
exclusion clauses on consumers that require a consumer to waive 
the liability of the supplier on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or 
unjust, or if such terms are imposed as a condition of entering into an 
agreement.21 In the hospital context, the consumers are the patients 
and the suppliers are the hospitals.
The Act lists the criteria for when a term or condition of a contract is 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust. These include: 
a)  A term or condition is excessively one-sided in favour of any person 
other than the consumer.
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b)  Terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the 
consumer as to be inequitable. 
c)  The consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation or statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of 
the supplier, to the detriment of the consumer.
d)  The transaction or agreement was subject to a term, condition or 
notice that is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable, or 
the fact, nature and effect of that term, condition or notice was not 
drawn to the attention of the consumer as required by the Act.22 
If these criteria had been applied to the exclusion clause in the Afrox 
decision mentioned above, the clause would have been declared 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust in terms of (a), (b) and (d) above22 
and invalidated in terms of the Act.18 Therefore, had the Consumer 
Protection Act4 been in force at the time, the patient in the Afrox case 
would have succeeded against the hospital.
Terms and conditions that have to be drawn to the 
attention of consumers
The Consumer Protection Act4 provides that certain terms and 
conditions must be drawn to the attention of consumers, particularly 
exclusion clauses that limit the liability of service providers. The Act 
sets out how this must be done.19 
Notices to consumers or provisions in consumer agreements must be 
drawn to consumers’ attention if such notice or provisions: 
a)  limit in any way the risk or liability of the supplier or any other 
person for any cause 
b) constitute an assumption of risk or liability by the consumer 
c)  impose an obligation on the consumer to indemnify the supplier 
or any other person for any cause 
d) are an acknowledgement of any fact by the consumer.23 
The conditions referred to in (a), (b) and (c) above were included in 
the exclusion clause that protected the hospital from liability in the 
Afrox case, and, had the Act been in force, they would have had to 
have been drawn to the patient’s attention.
In addition the supplier must specifically draw the fact, nature and 
potential effect of the certain risks to the consumer’s attention, 
and the consumer must have agreed to the provision or notice by 
signing or initialling it or otherwise indicating acknowledgment of 
the notice, awareness of risk and acceptance of the provision. This is 
required for any risk: 
a) that is of an unusual character or nature 
b)  the presence of which the consumer could not reasonably be 
expected to be aware of or notice, which an ordinarily alert 
consumer could not reasonably be expected to notice or 
contemplate in the circumstances
c) could result in serious injury or death.24 
Protection from liability for the latter in (c) above was included in 
the Afrox case exclusion clause, and, had the Act been in force, the 
hospital would have had to have drawn it to the attention of the 
patient as he had alleged in his claim – although it is submitted that 
such a provision would in any event be unconstitutional, as well 
as being unfair, unreasonable and unjust, and could be struck out 
by the patient. However, the court in the the Afrox case might still 
have found – wrongly, it is submitted – that (a) and (b) did not apply, 
because in its view such clauses are the rule rather than the exception 
and reasonable consumers should expect them.
The Act also prohibits exclusion clauses being cast in complicated 
language and buried in the small print. It provides that any 
such provisions, conditions or notices must be written in plain 
language,25 and must be drawn to the attention of the consumer 
in a conspicuous manner and form likely to attract the attention of 
an ordinarily alert consumer having regard to the circumstances. 
Furthermore, this must be done before the consumer enters into the 
agreement; begins to engage in the activity; enters or gains access 
to the facility; or is required or expected to pay for the transaction.26 
Finally, the consumer must be given an adequate opportunity in the 
circumstances to receive and comprehend the provision or notice.27 
At the time of the Afrox case there was no legal requirement for this 
to be done, and it seems that in any event the patient signed the 
agreement without reading it.
As in the Afrox decision, the Act prohibits the use of exclusion clauses 
that exclude liability for gross negligence.28 
Conclusion
The decision in the Afrox case held that the common law recognises 
the ability of hospitals to exclude liability for medical malpractice 
resulting in death or physical or psychological injury – save in the 
case of gross negligence. However, this has now been superseded 
by the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act. The Act states that 
unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms are prohibited and that 
certain terms and conditions have to be drawn to the attention of 
consumers and cannot be buried in the small print. Exclusion clauses 
that unfairly, unreasonably or unjustly protect hospitals from liability 
for death or bodily or psychological injury caused by the fault of their 
staff may be declared invalid and not binding on consumers; they 
may also be regarded as unconstitutional. 
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